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Abstract
This study considers a duopoly model in which both a consumer-friendly (CF) firm and a for-profit (FP) firm
undertake cost-reducing R&D investments in an endogenous R&D timing game and then play Cournot output
competition. When the CF firm chooses its profit-oriented consumer-friendliness, we show that the consumer-
friendliness is non-monotone in spillovers under both simultaneous-move and sequential-move with FP firm’s lead-
ership while it is decreasing under sequential-move with CF firm’s leadership. We also show that a simultaneous-
move outcome is a unique equilibrium when the spillovers are low and the CF firm invests higher R&D and
obtains higher profits. When the spillovers are not low, two sequential-move outcomes appear and the CF firm
might obtain lower profits with higher spillovers under the CF firm leadership.
Keywords: simultaneous R&D decisions; sequential R&D decisions; consumer-friendly firm; R&D spillovers
1. Introduction
Since the last generation, due to the explosive expansion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the world,1
CSR activities have become the most popular and imperative business practices. Nowadays, many oligopolistic
industries where a few significant firms compete are characterized by different organizational structures with the
coexistence of for-profit firms and not-for-profit firms. As a result, the heterogeneity of objectives among the5
firms emerges as an essential research topic in recent literature.2
The recent topic on CSR has received increasing attention from broad research in both empirical and theoretical
economics.3 From the theoretical approach of applied microeconomics, many studies have analyzed different
Email addresses: mariellealc@gmail.com (Mariel Leal), aru.gmtz@hotmail.com (Arturo Garc´ıa), sangho@jnu.ac.kr
(Corresponding author) (Sang-Ho Lee)
1According to KPMG (2015) survey on the top 100 firms in 45 countries, 73 percent of them declared the accomplishment of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in their financial reports. Moreover, the Global Fortune Index, which includes the
world’s 250 largest firms, has declared more than 92 percent.
2For example, Chirco et al. (2013), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Flores and Garc´ıa (2016), Cho and Lee (2017) and Kim et al.
(2019) showed that behavioral heterogeneity may produce different market performances and welfare consequences.
3Numerous studies have formulated theoretical approaches on the CSR in the field of applied microeconomic theory such as public
economics and the theory of industrial organization. For example, see Goering (2012, 2014), Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and
Grothe (2013, 2015), Kopel (2015), Liu et al. (2015), Xu et al. (2016), Leal et al. (2018) and Garcia et al. (2019b) among others.
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competition models of oligopolies where profit-maximizing firms compete with their rival firms that might adopt
CSR activities. In particular, they utilized a model in which the firm adopts consumer surplus as a proxy of its10
CSR concerns. That is, a CSR initiative includes both profitability and consumer surplus, and thus the objective
of CSR firm is a combination of consumers surplus and its profits. Then, the firms put a higher weight on output
in productions competition, which induces rivals to reduce their outputs under strategic substitutes relationship
and thus profits can be higher for a firm which adopts CSR activities.4
Though plentiful, the literature on CSR often ignores the importance of R&D investments, which are sig-15
nificant in the R&D-intensive industries such as health-care, medical, energy, and biotechnology. As well as
empirically relevant, the study of R&D activities is becoming increasingly popular from a theoretical perspective.
In particular, one important feature is whether R&D findings are perfectly appropriated by the innovating firm
or not.5 Hence, the analysis of the relationship between CSR initiatives and R&D spillovers is one of the key
factors in understanding the market equilibrium under the heterogeneity of objectives among the firms.20
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly model in output competition in which a consumer-friendly (CF)
firm competes with a for-profit (FP) firm not only in output productions but R&D investments for cost-reducing
(process) innovation in the presence of spillovers. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether the sequential
move can be more appropriate than a simultaneous move in modeling the R&D phase of the endogenous R&D
timing game. We then provide the conditions where the consumer-friendliness can be more profitable to the CF25
firm than the FP firm in modeling the R&D choices. Based on the previous findings in Lambertini and Tampieri
(2015) and Garcia et al. (2019b) that the CF firm expands its outputs and obtains higher profits than the FP
firm, we keep Cournot competition in the last period on output decisions so that we can eliminate the first-mover
advantage position in the timing of output choices. We then raise a question of sequencing R&D decisions which
characterize the R&D leader and follower. Hence, we can compare simultaneous-move versus sequential-move in30
R&D decisions with spillovers and identify the profitable conditions of consumer-friendliness.
In the analysis, we assume that the CF firm can strategically choose its profit-oriented consumer-friendliness
and then examine the endogenous R&D timing game in which both firms decides R&D investments sequentially
Regarding empirical works, see Flammer (2013, 2015), Chen et al. (2016) and Nishitani et al. (2017).
4The approach that CSR concerns account for consumer surplus is very closely related to the literature on strategic delegation and
sales targets for managers in oligopolies. Since Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Vickers (1985) suggested the managerial delegation
model, it is well-known that owners in an oligopoly may choose non-profit maximization as the optimal managerial incentives and
include sales to commit the managers to more aggressive behavior in the output market. As for extensive works with strategic motives
for CSR, Fanti and Buccella (2016) examined the network effects while Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015), Hirose
et al. (2017) and Lee and Park (2019) incorporated environmental concern. See also Fanti and Buccella (2017) and Kim et al. (2019)
for more literature on the strategic approaches on CSR.
5A sizeable literature on the choice of R&D in the strategic delegation has been emerged recently. See, for example, Zhang and
Zhang (1997), Kra¨kel (2004), Kopel and Riegler (2006) and Pal (2010). As empirical works, Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Kastl et al.
(2013) documented a positive correlation between delegation and innovation.
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or simultaneously. The main findings are as follows: On the one hand, we show that the CF firm always produces
higher outputs than the FP firm irrespective of spillovers. But, the consumer-friendliness is non-monotone35
in spillovers under the simultaneous-move and sequential-move with FP firm’s leadership in R&D while it is
decreasing under the sequential-move with CF firm’s leadership.
On the other hand, we show that R&D spillovers are crucial factors in determining the equilibrium of endoge-
nous timing game. When the spillovers are low, a simultaneous-move outcome is a unique equilibrium and the CF
firm invest higher R&D and obtain higher profits. When the spillovers are not low, however, two sequential-move40
outcomes appear. In particular, the CF firm can always obtain higher profits under the FP firm leadership while
it might obtain lower profits with higher spillovers under the CF firm leadership. It implies that being a CF
firm under the CF firm leadership is profitable only when the spillovers are not so high. Hence, we can conclude
that the firm may strategically use CSR initiative as a credible commitment to obtain higher profits than its
profit-seeking competitors only when the spillovers are not so high.45
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a duopoly model with a CF firm
and an FP firm investing cost-reducing R&D activities. We analyze the simultaneous and sequential movements
in section 3 and compare the outcomes to find an endogenous timing in choosing R&D decisions in section 4.
Final section concludes the paper.
2. Model50
We consider a homogeneous goods duopoly in an R&D and then quantity-setting game. One of the firms is
a consumer-friendly (CF) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 0) that cares for not only its profits but consumers
surplus. The other is a for-profit (FP) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 1) that maximizes only its profits. Firms
sell their output q0 > 0 and q1 > 0, respectively, at the market clearing price p(Q) = a−Q where Q = q0 + q1.
We consider a (convex) production cost function of each firm. Firms invest in R&D to reduce the initial
production costs. In particular, adopting the approach suggested by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we
assume that reducing production costs by xi units requires
x2i
2 as R&D expenditures.
6 However, the appropriability
of research knowledge is imperfect and its leakages benefit the competitor, i.e., there exist R&D spillovers. Then,
taking R&D activities and associated spillovers into consideration, the production costs are reduced to
c(qi;xi) = (c− xi − βxj)qi + q
2
i +
x2i
2
i, j = 0, 1, i 6= j,
6In the R&D literature, there are two ways of modeling cost-reducing R&D investments with spillovers across firms in an oligopoly
context. Kamien et al. (1992) position the spillover effect on the R&D input while D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) position the
spillover effect on the final cost reduction. We adopted the latter approach, in which convex cost function is generally assumed. As
related works in the context of mixed oligopoly where private firms compete with non-profit firms in R&D investemnts, see Gil-Molto´
et al. (2011), Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Lee and Tomaru (2017) and Lee et al. (2017).
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where β ∈ [0, 1] is the research spillovers rate: R&D findings are perfectly appropriated if β = 0 while research55
rewards perfectly spill over to the rival or are shared between firms if β = 1. It is assumed that a > c > xi + βxj
for an interior solution.
Firms’ profits are given by
πi = p · qi − c(qi;xi) (1)
We assume that the CF firm is in a managerial delegation contract in which R&D and production decisions are
delegated to a manager. That is, to maximize the profits, the owner of the firm 0 specifies a degree of consumer-
friendliness as an incentive contract with the manager.7 Then, the manager is assumed to maximize the profit of
the firm 0 plus a fraction of consumer surplus (CS) in production. Thus, the objective function of the manager
of the firm 0 is given by:
V0 = π0 + θCS (2)
where CS = Q
2
2 . The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] represents the extent to which firm 0 concerns with CSR specified in
the incentive contract.
The setting is a multi-stage game. In the first stage, the CF firm sets up the managerial incentive scheme, θ60
to maximize its profits. In the second stage, firms compete with R&D: the manager of the firm 0 chooses R&D
investment given θ prescribed in the first stage to maximize his objective function, while firm 1 chooses its R&D
investment to maximize its profits. In this stage, we have an either simultaneous or sequential choice. Finally,
firms compete with outputs in the last stage. We solve this game by backward induction and find a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.65
3. The Analysis
3.1. Output decisions
In the last stage, the first-order conditions of the CF firm and the FP firm are as follows, respectively:
∂V0
∂q0
= a− (2− θ)q0 − (1− θ)q1 − (c− x0 − βx1 + 2q0) = 0
∂π1
∂q1
= a− q0 − 2q1 − (c− x1 − βx0 + 2q1) = 0 (3)
Solving these conditions yield the equilibrium outputs of the CF and FP firms as
q0 =
(a− c)(3 + θ) + (4− β(1− θ))x0 − (1− 4β − θ)x1
3(5− θ)
q1 =
(a− c)(3− θ)− (1− β(4− θ))x0 + (4− β − θ)x1
3(5− θ)
(4)
7In the managerial delegation contract, the firm may strategically use CSR initiative as a commitment device to expand the
outputs and thus the firm that adopts CSR obtains higher profits than its profit-seeking competitors. For recent discussion on the
theoretical relation between managerial delegation and CSR, see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Hirose et al. (2017), Lee and Park
(2019) and Garcia et al. (2019a).
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The relationships between outputs and R&D are
∂q0
∂x0
=
4− β(1− θ)
3(5− θ)
> 0,
∂q0
∂x1
= −
1− 4β − θ
3(5− θ)
and
∂q1
∂x0
= −
1− β(4− θ)
3(5− θ)
,
∂q1
∂x1
=
4− β − θ
3(5− θ)
> 0
A few remarks are in order. First, the effect of each firm’s R&D on its output is positive, but it is weakened
as spillovers increase. In particular, a firm’s own R&D contributes more to its output than its rival’s R&D does,
i.e., ∂qi
∂xi
≥ ∂qi
∂xj
. Second, a firm’s R&D has two countervailing spillovers effect on rival’s performance: one is a70
positive business augmenting effect and the other a negative business stealing effect. These strategic effects are
dissimilar across firms. In particular, the strategic effects from the FP firm’s R&D to the CF firm depend on
β>
<
1−θ
4 while those from the CF firm’s R&D to the FP firm depend on β
>
<
1
4−θ : (i) if spillovers rate is small, i.e.,
0 ≤ β < 1−θ4 , both firms’ R&D has negative effects (ii) if spillovers rate is intermediate, i.e.,
1−θ
4 < β <
1
4−θ ,
FP’s R&D provides positive effects while CF’s R&D provides negative effects (iii) if the spillovers rate is high,75
i.e., 14−θ < β ≤ 1, both firms’ R&D has positive effects.
3.2. R&D decisions and strategic CSR
In the second stage, the FP is a pure profit-maximizing firm in determining R&D. However, CF is in a
managerial delegation mode in which manager determines R&D investments to maximize the objective function
while the owner determines its degree of strategic CSR in the first stage of the game.80
We will analyze three scenarios: simultaneous choice, and sequential choice with FP leadership and with CF
leadership.
3.2.1. Simultaneous scenario
The CF firm’s manager determines R&D in order to maximize (2), while the FP firm chooses its R&D
investment that maximizes its profit. The following are its R&D choices, respectively:8
x0 =
(a−c)(4(116+51β−36β2+4β3)+(−1+141β+132β2−20β3)θ+4(−16−23β−10β2+β3)θ2+(9+11β+4β2)θ3)
∆1
x1 =
4(a−c)(116+51β−36β2+4β3+(−109−36β+33β2−5β3)θ+(32+10β−10β2+β3)θ2+(−3−β+β2)θ3)
∆1
(5)
From eqn. (5), we have the following lemma.9
Lemma 1. x0 ≥ x1 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. Also, x0 increases with θ whereas x1 decreases with θ.85
This represents that the CF firm will take higher investment, which is increasing in consumer-friendliness,
irrespective of spillovers under simultaneous game. This is because, as mentioned in Lambertini and Tampieri
(2015) and Garcia et al. (2019b), the CF firm expands more outputs in output production game and this position
encourages more R&D investment to reduce its output production cost in a simultaneous game.
8For expositional convenience, we provide ∆i and νi (i = 1, 2, 3) in Appendix B.
9The Proof of lemmas and propositions in this section will be provided in Appendix A.
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In the first stage of the game, the owner of CF firm chooses parameter θ to maximize (1). Solving it, we90
obtain very complicated outcomes and thus we simply report the following results: Let θsm satisfies ∂pi0
∂θ
= 0.
Then, we have the following relationships in a simultaneous R&D equilibrium:
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Proposition 1. Under a simultaneous R&D competition, we have that
a) θsm is a convex function of β, which first decreases and then increases at β ≈ 0.786.95
b) qsm0 > q
sm
1 for any β ∈ [0, 1]; q
sm
0 is a convex function of β whereas q
sm
1 is a concave function of β.
c) xsm0 > x
sm
1 for any β ∈ [0, 1]; x
sm
0 monotonically decreases with β whereas x
sm
1 is a concave function of β.
d) πsm0 > π
sm
1 if and only if β < β¯1 ≈ 0.8198; firm’s profit increases with β.
This proposition states that in a simultaneous R&D competition, CF firm invests and produces more than FP
firm with strategic consumer-friendliness, which decreases if spillovers rate is not so high but increases when the100
spillovers rate is so high. Thus, spillovers have a detrimental effect on the choice of consumer-friendliness of the
CF firm. However, both firms get higher profit as spillovers rate increases and CF firm can get a higher profit
than that of FP firm only when spillovers rate is not so high. Hence, when the spillovers rate is so high, a larger
production of the CF firm in output competition will provide a negative effect on its profit.
3.2.2. Sequential scenario with FP leadership105
We further address the Stackelberg situation, in which the FP firm plays the leading position while the CF
firm responds. Using backward induction, the CF firm’s manager chooses the R&D investment that maximizes
6
eqn. (2), that is, according to ∂V0
∂x0
= 0, we have
x0(x1) =
(a−c)(48+θ−3θ2−β(12−23θ+5θ2))−(16−16θ+3θ2+2β(−34+4θ+θ2)+β2(16−16θ+3θ2))x1
161−75θ+9θ2+β2(−4−7θ+2θ2)+β(32−32θ+6θ2)
By inserting x0(x1) into the FP firm’s profits and using
∂pi1
∂x1
= 0, we get the equilibrium R&D efforts as
follows:
x0 =
(a−c)(4(1228+957β−796β2+440β3−144β4+16β5)+ν1(β,θ))
∆2
x1 =
4(a−c)(29+20β−4β2+(−20−9β+5β2)θ+(3+β−β2)θ2)(44−β(11+4(−4+β)β)+(−23+β(−2−4β+5β2))θ+(3+β−β3)θ2)
∆2
(6)
From eqn. (6) we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. x0 ≥ x1 if and only if θˆ(β) ≤ θ ≤ 1, where θˆ satisfies x0 = x1. Also, x0 increases with θ whereas x1
decreases (increases) with θ if β is low enough (high enough).
This represents that the CF firm will take higher (lower) investment with a lower (higher) degree of spillovers
under sequential game with FP leadership even though the CF firm will expand more outputs in the production110
game.
Now regarding the first stage of the game, when solving it, we obtain the following results: Let θfp satisfies
∂pi0
∂θ
= 0. Then, we have the following relationships in a sequential R&D equilibrium where FP firm acts as the
leader:
115
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
β
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
0.34
q0
fp
q1
fp
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
β
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.30
x0
fp
x1
fp
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
β
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
θfp
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
β
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
π0
fp
π1
fp
Figure 2
7
Proposition 2. Under a sequential R&D competition where FP firm acts as the leader, we have that
a) θfp is a convex function of β, which first decreases and then increases at β ≈ 0.5694.
b) qfp0 > q
fp
1 for any β ∈ [0, 1]; q
fp
0 is a convex function of β whereas q
fp
1 monotonically increases with β.
c) xfp0 > x
fp
1 if and only if β < β¯2 ≈ 0.662; each firm’s investment in R&D, x
fp
i , is a convex function of β.
d) πfp0 > π
fp
1 for any β ∈ [0, 1]; firm’s profit increases with β.120
This proposition states that in a sequential R&D competition with FP firm’s leadership, CF firm invests
more than FP firm only when the spillovers rate is not so high. Also, strategic consumer-friendliness decreases
if spillovers rate is not so high but increases when the spillovers rate is high. Thus, spillovers have a detrimental
effect on the choice of consumer-friendliness of the CF firm. But, CF firm always gets a higher profit than that
of FP firm irrespective of spillovers rate. Hence, under a sequential R&D competition where FP firm acts as the125
leader, regardless of spillovers rate, a larger production of the CF firm in output competition will always provide
a positive effect to its profit.
3.2.3. Sequential scenario with CF leadership
We finally address another situation, in which the CF firm acts as the leader while the FP firm responds.
Similarly, according to ∂pi1
∂x1
= 0 we have
x1(x0) =
4(4− β − θ) ((a− c)(3− θ)− (1− β(4− θ))x0)
161− 4β2 + 8β(4− θ)− 58θ + 5θ2
By inserting x1(x0) into the CF firm manager’s objective function and using
∂V0
∂x0
= 0, we get the equilibrium
R&D efforts as follows:
x0 =
(a−c)(4(1276+561β+68β2+248β3−144β4+16β5)+ν2(β,θ))
∆3
x1 =
4(a−c)(4−β−θ)(307+316β−120β2+80β3−16β4+(−259−215β+119β2−36β3+4β4)θ+(65+46β−34β2+4β3)θ2+(−5−3β+3β2)θ3)
∆3
(7)
From eqn. (7) we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3. x0 ≥ x1 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. Also, x0 increases with θ whereas x1 decreases with θ.130
This also represents that the CF firm will take higher investment, which is also increasing in consumer-
friendliness, irrespective of spillovers under sequential game with CF leadership. Thus, the fact that the CF firm
can expand more outputs in production game requires higher output production to the CF firm when it acts as
a leader in R&D competition.
Similarly according to the first stage of the game, when solving it, we obtain the following results: Let θcf135
satisfies ∂pi0
∂θ
= 0. Then, we have the following relationships in under a sequential R&D equilibrium where CF
firm plays the leading position:
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Proposition 3. Under a sequential R&D competition where CF firm plays the leading position, we have that
a) θcf decreases with β and, in the vicinity of β ≈ 0.7364 the CSR becomes null.140
b) qcf0 ≥ q
cf
1 for any β ∈ [0, 1]; q
cf
0 is a convex function of β whereas q
cf
1 monotonically increases with β.
c) xcf0 > x
cf
1 for any β ∈ [0, 1]; x
cf
0 is a convex function of β whereas x
cf
1 is a concave function of β.
d) πcf0 > π
cf
1 if and only if β < β¯3 ≈ 0.534; firm’s profit increases with β.
This proposition states that in a sequential R&D competition with CF firm’s leadership, CF firm invests and
produces more than FP firm, but the strategic consumer-friendliness is non-increasing with spillovers rate. In145
particular, if the spillovers rate is so high, CF firm chooses non-commitment on consumer-friendliness and thus
both firms become the same profit-maximizing firms when the spillovers rate is so high. However, both firms get
higher profit as spillovers rate increases and CF firm can get a higher profit than that of FP firm only when it
adopts positive CSR where spillovers rate is not so high. Hence, when the spillovers rate is not so high, a larger
production of the CF firm in output competition will induce a higher R&D and higher profit.150
4. Endogenous R&D Timing
We examine the modified format of endogenous timing game where both firms choose its timing to move
between ”early” (t = 1) and ”late” (t = 2) in determining R&D decisions.10 If both firms choose the same period,
10Regarding model descriptions on the endogenous timing game, see Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Garcia et al. (2019b), among
others.
9
the equilibrium is a simultaneous-move game. Otherwise, the equilibrium is a sequential move game. Table 1
provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game.155
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of the Observable Delay Game in a mixed market
Firm 0/1 t1 = 1 t1 = 2
t0 = 1 (π
sm
0 , π
sm
1 ) (π
cf
0 , π
cf
1 )
t0 = 2 (π
fp
0 , π
fp
1 ) (π
sm
0 , π
sm
1 )
In order to find the equilibrium of the endogenous timing R&D game, we will compare the firms’ profits under
each scenario, which give us the following results:
Lemma 4. Comparing profits provides the following relationships:
a) πsm0 ≥ π
cf
0 if β ∈ [0, 0.199]. Otherwise, π
sm
0 < π
cf
0
b) πsm0 ≥ π
fp
0 if β ∈ [0, 0.225]. Otherwise, π
sm
0 < π
fp
0160
c) πsm1 ≥ π
fp
1 if β ∈ [0, 0.25]. Otherwise, π
sm
1 < π
fp
1
d) πsm1 ≥ π
cf
1 if β ∈ [0, 0.259]. Otherwise, π
sm
1 < π
cf
1 .
Using this lemma, we have the following result:
Proposition 4. The equilibrium of endogenous R&D timing game is as follows:
a) If β ∈ [0, 0.199], then either (t0, t1)=(1, 1) or (t0, t1)=(2, 2), is equilibrium outcome.165
b) If β ∈ (0.199, 0.225], then the only equilibrium of the game is the simultaneous movement, (t0, t1)=(1, 1);
c) If β ∈ (0.225, 0.25], then no equilibrium outcome exists.
d) If β ∈ (0.25, 0.259], then the only equilibrium is the sequential-move outcome, (t0, t1)=(2, 1), in which the FP
firm acts as the leader.
e) If β ∈ (0.259, 1], then either the CF or FP firm can be the Stackelberg leader. That is, (t0, t1)=(1,2) and170
(t0, t1)=(2,1), are equilibrium outcomes.
Propositions 4 states that the degree of spillovers affects the sequencing R&D. In particular, simultaneous
choice of R&D appears when spillovers rate is low while the sequential choice of R&D appears when spillovers
rate is high. Furthermore, if β ∈ (0.25, 0.259], the only equilibrium is the sequential-move outcome where the FP
firm acts as the leader. It also implies that simultaneous R&D game is appropriate when spillovers rate is low175
while simultaneous R&D game is problematic when spillovers rate is high. Finally, it is noteworthy that at the
equilibrium of endogenous R&D timing game, CF firm always chooses higher output productions regardless of
spillovers rate, and gets higher profits than FP firm if spillovers rate is small.
Finally, we provide two remarks which show that our findings are robust in different context:
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Remark 1. If comparing the case where both firms are pure profit-maximizing firms, the strategic consumer-180
friendliness of the CF firm might change the equilibrium of endogenous R&D timing game only when the spillovers
are intermediate.11
Remark 2. Instead of the manager, if the owner chooses R&D, simultaneous move game is the only equilibrium
outcome of endogenous R&D timing game when β ∈ [0, 0.25].12
5. Concluding Remarks185
This paper considers an endogenous R&D timing game in which a CF firm competes with an FP firm in R&D
investments in the presence of spillovers, and then play Cournot output competition. We compare simultaneous
versus sequential move in R&D decisions and then provide the conditions on spillovers where the consumer-
friendliness can be more profitable to the CF firm than the FP firm. In the endogenous R&D timing game, we
found that the CF firm always produces higher outputs than the FP firm irrespective of spillovers. But, the190
consumer-friendliness is non-monotone in spillovers under the simultaneous-move and sequential-move with FP
firm’s leadership in R&D while it is decreasing under the sequential-move with CF firm’s leadership. We also
found that R&D spillovers are crucial factors in determining the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. When
the spillovers are low, a simultaneous-move outcome is a unique equilibrium and the CF firm invest higher R&D
and obtain higher profits. When the spillovers are not low, however, two sequential-move outcomes appear. In195
particular, the CF firm can always obtain higher profits under the FP firm leadership while it might obtain lower
profits with higher spillovers under the CF firm leadership. We can conclude that the firm may strategically use
CSR initiative as a credible commitment to obtain higher profits than its profit-seeking competitors only when
the spillovers are not so high.
Our analysis has limitations because of simple duopoly modeling with linear demand and quadratic cost func-200
tions. It should be extended into more general settings such as differentiated products in oligopoly competition. It
is also important to investigate real-world evidence of CSR behaviors and R&D decisions to analyze governmental
role on the firm’s CSR initiatives.13 Finally, further strategic avenues of the firms should include cooperative
11In specific, if β ∈ (0.25, 0.259], the equilibrium is sequential move with either of the firms acting as a leader when both firms are
pure profit-maximizing firms. Rigorous proofs on the remarks will be provided by authors upon request.
12It is not clear to identify whether the R&D decision in the long-run process will be delegated to the manager in the context of
business strategy planning. It is also noted that the characteristics of R&D will be classified between irreversible R&D and flexible
R&D, depending on the contractual scopes and risk expenditures. The latter refers R&D decisions in the short-term contract (such
as decisions on new auto-machines and cost-reducing material purchases), which can be usually delegated to the manager, while
the former refers R&D decisions in the long-term contract (such as decisions on relocation, research joint venture and cost-reducing
M&A), which are counted as high risk expenditures.
13The promotion of CSR has become a top priority in the global policy agenda such as EU and UN. This calls for the government
to realize the full benefits that CSR can bring. For more descriptions, see Xu and Lee (2019).
11
managerial delegation or endogenous equilibrium choice in a strategic delegation game. These are challenging
future research.205
References
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Lelarge, C., Van Reenen, J., Zilibotti, F., 2007. Technology, information, and the
decentralization of the firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 1759–1799.
Brand, B., Grothe, M., 2013. A note on ’corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination’.
Research in Economics 67, 324–327.210
Brand, B., Grothe, M., 2015. Social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly. Journal of Economics 115, 275–289.
Chen, Y.H., Wen, X.W., Luo, M.Z., 2016. Corporate social responsibility spillover and competition effects on the
food industry. Australian Economic Papers 55, 1–13. doi:10.1111/1467-8454.12058.
Chirco, A., Colombo, C., Scrimitore, M., 2013. Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral het-
erogeneity. Theory and Decision 74, 55–74.215
Cho, S., Lee, S.H., 2017. Subsidization policy on the social enterprise for the underprivileged. Korean Economic
Review 33, 153–178.
D’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative r&d in duopoly with spillovers. American
Economic Review 78, 1133–1137.
Fanti, L., Buccella, D., 2016. Network externalities and corporate social responsibility. Economics Bulletin 36,220
2043–2050.
Fanti, L., Buccella, D., 2017. Corporate social responsibility, profits and welfare with managerial firms. Interna-
tional Review of Economics 64, 341–356.
Fershtman, C., Judd, K.L., 1987. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly. American Economic Review 77, 927.
Flammer, C., 2013. Corporate social responsibility and shareholder reaction: The environmental awareness of225
investors. Academy of Management Journal 56, 758–781. doi:10.5465/amj.2011.0744.
Flammer, C., 2015. Does corporate social responsibility lead to superior financial performance? a regression
discontinuity approach. Management Science 61, 2549–2568. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2038.
Flores, D., Garc´ıa, A., 2016. On the output and welfare effects of a non-profit firm in a mixed duopoly: A
generalization. Economic Systems 40, 631–637.230
12
Garcia, A., Leal, M., Lee, S.H., 2019a. Cooperation with a multiproduct corporation in a strategic managerial
delegation. Managerial and Decision Economics Article in Press.
Garcia, A., Leal, M., Lee, S.H., 2019b. Endogenous timing with a socially responsible firm. Korean Economic
Review 35, 345–370.
Gil-Molto´, M., Poyago-Theotoky, J., Zikos, V., 2011. R&d subsidies, spillovers, and privatization in mixed235
markets. Southern Economic Journal 78, 233–255.
Goering, G.E., 2012. Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination. Research in Economics
66, 142 – 148.
Goering, G.E., 2014. The profit-maximizing case for corporate social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly.
Managerial and Decision Economics 35, 493–499.240
Hamilton, J.H., Slutsky, S.M., 1990. Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria.
Games and Economic Behavior 2, 29 – 46.
Hirose, K., Lee, S.H., Matsumura, T., 2017. Environmental corporate social responsibility: A note on the first-
mover advantage under price competition. Economics Bulletin 37, 214–221.
Kamien, M.I., Muller, E., Zang, I., 1992. Research joint ventures and r&d cartels. The American Economic245
Review 82, 1293–1306.
Kastl, J., Martimort, D., Piccolo, S., 2013. Delegation, ownership concentration and r&d spending: Evidence
from italy. Journal of Industrial Economics 61, 84–107.
Kesavayuth, D., Zikos, V., 2013. R&d versus output subsidies in mixed markets. Economics Letters 118, 293–296.
Kim, S.L., Lee, S.H., Matsumura, T., 2019. Corporate social responsibility and privatization policy in a mixed250
oligopoly. Journal of Economics 128, 67–89. doi:10.1007/s00712-018-00651-7.
Kopel, M., 2015. Price and quantity contracts in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm. Managerial
and Decision Economics 36, 559–566.
Kopel, M., Brand, B., 2012. Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives. Economic
Modelling 29, 982 – 989.255
Kopel, M., Riegler, C., 2006. R&d in a strategic delegation game revisited: A note. Managerial and Decision
Economics 27, 605–612.
Kra¨kel, M., 2004. R&d spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests. Managerial and Decision
Economics 25, 147–156.
13
Lambertini, L., Tampieri, A., 2015. Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a260
cournot oligopoly. Economic Modelling 50, 40 – 48.
Leal, M., Garc´ıa, A., Lee, S.H., 2018. The timing of environmental tax policy with a consumer-friendly firm.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 59, 25–43.
Lee, S.H., Muminov, T., Tomaru, Y., 2017. Partial privatization and subsidization in a mixed duopoly: R&d
versus output subsidies. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 58, 163–177.265
Lee, S.H., Park, C.H., 2019. Eco-firms and the sequential adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility
in the managerial delegation. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19.
Lee, S.H., Tomaru, Y., 2017. Output and r&d subsidies in a mixed oligopoly. Operations Research Letters 45,
238–241.
Liu, C.C., Wang, L., Lee, S.H., 2015. Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated270
duopoly market. Economics Letters 129, 108–111.
Matsumura, T., Ogawa, A., 2014. Corporate social responsibility or payoff asymmetry? a study of an endogenous
timing game. Southern Economic Journal 81, 457–473.
Nishitani, K., Jannah, N., Kaneko, S., Hardinsyah, 2017. Does corporate environmental performance enhance
financial performance? an empirical study of indonesian firms. Environmental Development 23, 10–21. doi:10.275
1016/j.envdev.2017.06.003.
Pal, R., 2010. Cooperative managerial delegation, r&d and collusion. Bulletin of Economic Research 62, 155–169.
Vickers, J., 1985. Delegation and the theory of the firm. Economic Journal 95, 138–147.
Xu, L., Cho, S., Lee, S.H., 2016. Emission tax and optimal privatization in cournot–bertrand comparison.
Economic Modelling 55, 73 – 82.280
Xu, L., Lee, S.H., 2019. Tariffs and privatization policy in a bilateral trade with corporate social responsibility.
Economic Modelling .
Zhang, J., Zhang, Z., 1997. R&d in a strategic delegation game. Managerial and Decision Economics 18, 391–398.
Appendix A. Simultaneous and sequential R&D competition
Proof of Lemma 1
x0 − x1 =
3(a− c)(5− θ)θ(29 + 19β − 7θ − 5βθ)
∆1
≥ 0, for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]
∂x0
∂θ
=
3(a− c)ǫ1
∆21
> 0,
∂x1
∂θ
= −
12(a− c)ǫ2
∆21
< 0.
14
where ǫ1 ≡163995−141056θ+45131θ2−6394θ3+340θ4−4β5(−100−48θ+91θ2−30θ3+3θ4)−4β4(1480−720θ+127θ2−22θ3+3θ4)285
+β3(−3240−3088θ+3023θ2−694θ3+47θ4)+β2(105500−95904θ+32855θ2−5030θ3+291θ4)+β
(
257665−224184θ+72719θ2−10482θ3
+570θ4
)
>0 and ǫ2 ≡21025−19488θ+6749θ2−1038θ3+60θ4−2β5(−4+θ)2(15−2θ+θ2)+β2(−19665+17192θ−5482θ2+752θ3−37θ4)
+β3(−3100+4596θ−2170θ2+424θ3−30θ4)+β4(3940−3024θ+725θ2−42θ3−3θ4)+β(6380−8220θ+3656θ2−692θ3+48θ4)>0.
Proof of Proposition 1
∂2pi0
∂θ2
< 0 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. Now ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→0
=
30(a−c)2(2871−4256β+816β2+2784β3−784β4)
(29+20β−4β2)(59−12β+4β2)3
> 0 for290
any β ∈ [0, 1] and ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→1
= −
(a−c)2(157197+399959β+259650β2−33382β3−37981β4+17615β5+1512β6−2240β7+294β8)
3(71+26β−25β2+4β3)3
< 0
for any β ∈ [0, 1]. The fact that ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→0
> 0 and ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→1
< 0 implies the existence of θsm ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂pi0
∂θ
= 0.
By substituting θsm into qi, xi and πi we obtain the figure 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
x0 − x1 = −
(a− c)ǫ3
∆2
where ǫ3 ≡ 192− 4925θ + 3402θ
2 − 798θ3 + 63θ4 + β3
(
−768 + 1292θ − 543θ2 + 75θ3 − 2θ4
)
+ 3β
(
− 528− 801θ295
+ 906θ2 − 268θ3 + 25θ4
)
+ β2
(
3456− 3036θ + 1443θ2 − 369θ3 + 36θ4
)
< 0 iff θˆ < θ ≤ 1 for any β ∈ [0, 1].
Regarding ∂x0
∂θ
and ∂x1
∂θ
we show the following contour-plots:
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Figure A.4
Proof of Proposition 2
Let µ1 ≡44627383183+27162552896β−97878998532β2+16174246080β3+137506521008β4+78638538496β5+70604951232β6300
−4968843264β7−4994814720β8+8267472896β9−5900045312β10+1783873536β11−395538432β12+70451200β13−5619712β14>0 and
15
µ2 ≡44267381717+131915016701β+70664147757β2−64122805393β3−15190851132β4+16292528946β5−14273759238β6+8826622830β7
+115135101β8−2259056223β9+625964841β10−15435117β11−12286566β12−419904β13>0. Then,
∂2pi0
∂θ2
< 0 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. Now ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→0
= 2(a−c)
2µ1
(73+54β−36β2+8β3)3(249+10β+28β2−8β3)3
> 0 for any
β ∈ [0, 1] and ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→1
= − (a−c)
2µ2
(143−18β+15β2)3(47+30β−33β2)3
< 0 for any β ∈ [0, 1]. The fact that ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→0
> 0 and305
∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→1
< 0 implies the existence of θfp ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂pi0
∂θ
= 0.
By substituting θfp into qi, xi and πi we obtain the figure 2.
Proof of Lemma 3
x0 − x1 =
(a− c)ǫ4
∆3
≥ 0, for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]
where ǫ4 ≡ 192+ 4253θ− 2637θ
2+531θ3− 35θ4+ β3
(
−768 + 100θ + 72θ2 − 12θ3
)
+ β
(
− 1584+ 6111θ− 3435θ2
+ 681θ3 − 45θ4
)
− 12β2
(
−288 + 116θ + 13θ2 − 10θ3 + θ4
)
≥ 0.
Regarding ∂x0
∂θ
and ∂x1
∂θ
we show the following contour-plots:310
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Figure A.5
Proof of Proposition 3
Let µ3≡2230767+898952β−4288472β2−1749792β3+669920β4−324608β5+8832β6+32768β7−4352β8>0 iff β < 0.7364; and
µ4≡61252038+207486522β+222060609β
2+74691882β3+3472929β4−9569790β5−8218953β6+4566642β7−2702812β8+967840β9−74729β10
−9340β11−6715β12+2564β13−223β14>0. Then,315
∂2pi0
∂θ2
< 0 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. Now ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→0
= 2(a−c)
2µ3
(18177+14176β−6380β2+2560β3−1360β4+512β5−64β6)2
> 0
iff β < 0.7364 and ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→1
= − (a−c)
2µ4
4(477+324β−264β2+24β3−20β4+18β5−3β6)3
< 0 for any β ∈ [0, 1]. The fact that
∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→0
> 0 and ∂pi0
∂θ
∣
∣
θ→1
< 0 implies the existence of θcf ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂pi0
∂θ
= 0.
By substituting θcf into qi, xi and πi we obtain the figure 3.
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Appendix B. Values of ∆i and νi320
∆1 ≡ 1711 + 832β − 360β
2 + 128β3 − 16β4 +
(
−1064− 680β + 27β2 − 112β3 + 20β4
)
θ
+
(
220 + 174β + 39β2 + 36β3 − 4β4
)
θ2 +
(
−15− 14β − 6β2 − 4β3
)
θ3 > 0.
∆2 ≡
(
73 + 54β − 36β2 + 8β3 +
(
−29− 28β + β2 − 10β3
)
θ +
(
3 + 4β + 2β2 + 2β3
)
θ2
)
·
(
249 + 10β
+ 28β2 − 8β3 +
(
−121− 36β − 15β2 + 10β3
)
θ +
(
15 + 8β + 2β2 − 2β3
)
θ2
)
> 0.
∆3 ≡ 18177 + 14176β − 6380β
2 + 2560β3 − 1360β4 + 512β5 − 64β6 +
(
− 14149− 12496β + 1897β2325
− 3552β3 + 1432β4 − 256β5 + 16β6
)
θ +
(
4104 + 4046β + 444β2 + 1688β3 − 432β4 + 32β5
)
θ2 +
(
− 525− 572β
− 203β2 − 336β3 + 40β4
)
θ3 +
(
25 + 30β + 18β2 + 24β3
)
θ4 > 0.
ν1 ≡(−1263−373β+2776β2−1476β3+928β4−160β5)θ+(−686−1330β−1507β2+175β3−420β4+132β5)θ2+
(
282+500β+429β2+77β3
+72β4−40β5
)
θ3+(−27−51β−44β2−14β3−4β4+4β5)θ4.
ν2 ≡(−1119+2443β+1852β2−1272β3+272β4−16β5)θ+(−561−2099β−1360β2+416β3−32β4)θ2+(191+469β+316β2−40β3)θ3−3
(
5330
+11β+8β2
)
θ4.
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